extAmount = 0, and so publicAmount = 0. The recipient never has to touch the chain: no gas to pay and no prior on-chain history to have.
Shielded address
The recipient hands out a shielded address, serialized aspp-addr: followed by two hex fields:
Ciphertext per output
A commitment alone is useless to its new owner: they cannot guess the blinding. So every one of the three outputs ships a ciphertext of its opening,(amount, blinding, asset), encrypted to the owner’s x25519 key:
ExtData, so they are inside extDataHash and bound into the proof. Nobody between you and the chain can swap, drop or re-encrypt one: a relayer that tampered with a ciphertext would invalidate the proof it was paid to submit. That is what makes delivery safe over an untrusted path. See Notes and proofs for the binding itself.
What is on-chain and what is not
A transfer names no token, so its three new leaves join the anonymity set of every listed token at once (Many tokens, one pool). Nor does the payload distinguish a payment from mere self-shuffling: a transfer that pays nobody but yourself produces exactly the same shape.
Scanning as recovery
The recipient finds the note by trying to decrypt it. The SDK’sscanShieldedNotes walks every commitment the pool ever emitted, attempts an authenticated decryption of each ciphertext with your encryption secret, and keeps the ones that open: